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Abstract: When playing videogames it is common practice to describe events in first-person terms; ‘I was bitten by the zombie’, ‘I hit Bison with a Shoryuken’ and so forth. What are we to make of this tendency? Are these first-person locutions a matter of the ordinary sort of make-believe that is involved in our engagement with standard fictions, or is there some better way of making sense of them? We begin this paper by briefly rehearsing some criticisms we have previously directed at Grant Tavinor‘s claim that the nature of our interactions (and especially our first-person engagement) with videogames undermines a key element of Kendall Walton’s account of fiction and make-believe. We then turn to an extended discussion of David Velleman‘s recent claim that in virtual environments, like those found in Second Life as well as standard videogames, we do not fictionally perform actions (as Walton would have it) but rather ‘literally perform’ fictional actions (Velleman, 2008: 407). We argue that that the challenge to Walton presented by Velleman is unsuccessful and, furthermore, that the alternate account of videogame engagement posed by Velleman misrepresents Walton’s account of make-believe. However, we conclude by arguing that there are still important lessons concerning first-person interaction with videogames to be drawn from the work of Tavinor and Velleman.

1. Introduction
Videogame players say the strangest things; ‘I invaded heaven with a band of demons’, ‘I keep getting killed by the men in...very dark brown’ and even ‘I travelled back in time to save my fellow dolphins’.​[1]​ How should we account for such comments? One obvious suggestion is that such remarks are part of a fiction. If we are to make sense of such remarks along these lines then one of the most promising places to turn is Kendall Walton’s book Mimesis as Make-Believe, which presents by far the most influential contemporary account of the nature of fictional representations. Walton outlines a very broad notion of fiction which includes anything which has the function of serving as a prop (i.e., something which mandates imaginings in virtue of various principles) in a game of make-believe (Walton, 1990: 69). Walton, then, counts not only ordinary or canonical examples such as horror novels, Hollywood movies and Shakespeare plays as fictions but also such unexpected items as toy trucks, patterned wallpaper and, for reasons having to do with his account of depiction, all pictures (Ibid: 293-352). We take it as obvious that videogames, or at least the vast majority of videogames, are fictions in this minimal sense. Videogames and their displays are designed to mandate all manner of imaginings: that there are zombies, that ghosts are chasing Pac-Man, that we are serving an ace in tennis, etc. As we will argue below this claim, when properly understood, should not be in the least bit controversial. In addition to this minimal claim, though, we believe that (most) videogames are Waltonian in a more full-blooded sense; that is, that they display all the features of fictions that are laid out in Mimesis as Make-Believe. 
Recently, however, there have been several challenges to construing videogames (and other virtual environments) as fictions in such robustly Waltonian terms. The strongly interactive nature of videogames and the level of first-person engagement involved in videogame play have seemed to some to mark them as importantly distinct from ordinary fictions. One relevant difference is that while it is common practice amongst players of videogames to describe certain goings on in the videogame environment in first-person terms (‘I crashed my car on the final corner’, ‘I was bitten by the zombie’, ‘I hit Bison with a Shoryuken’) it is far rarer, though if Walton is right not as rare as you may think, to describe our interactions with canonical fictions in this way. How are we to account for this disparity? Is this merely an accidental surface feature of our engagement with videogames or does it highlight some deep difference between videogames and canonical fictions? In an earlier paper (Meskin and Robson, forthcoming) we discussed and criticized one answer to this question, Grant Tavinor’s contention that our first-person engagement with videogames ’smudge’ (Tavinor, 2005: 34)  a key aspect of Walton’s account of fictions. This article briefly surveys these concerns but focuses primarily on a second, more radical, suggestion, by David Velleman, that in videogames we do not fictionally perform actions (as Walton would have it) but rather ‘literally perform’ fictional actions (Velleman, 2008: 407). We hold that while Velleman is right to claim that there are some important differences between videogames and most other fictions with respect to first-person involvement, he is mistaken in claiming that this undermines attempts to construe our engagement with videogames as a matter of make-believe with fictions.

In Section Two we examine some key aspects of what it is to be a fiction in the full-blooded Waltonian sense and say a little about how this applies in the case of videogames. In Section Three we briefly summarize our discussion of Tavinor’s claim that first-person interaction with videogames challenges some key aspects of the Waltonian account of fiction. In Sections Four and Five we focus on a recent article by David Velleman which puts forward a more fundamental challenge to construing videogames in terms of make-believe and argue that Velleman’s account also fails to undermine the claim that videogames are Waltonian fictions of a perfectly standard kind. In Section Six we survey some genuine differences between videogames and canonical fictions which are highlighted in the work of Tavinor and Velleman. We argue that, when properly understood, these differences are important and deserve to be taken into account in our theorising concerning videogames, but that there is no reason to think that they undermine the claim that videogames are full-blooded Waltonian fictions. 

2. Videogames as Fictions
The nature of fiction is a deeply contested one, so any attempt to explore the question of how videogames stand in relation to the category of fiction requires some sort of specification as to how that category will be understood. We shall follow Tavinor and Velleman in focusing on Kendall Walton’s influential account of fiction and asking whether that theory can make sense of videogames and our interactions with them.
	As stated above, fictions on Walton’s account are all those objects ‘possessing the social function of serving as props in games of make-believe’ (Walton, 1990: 69) and it is hopefully clear from the last section that most (perhaps all) videogames belong to this category. It is important, though, to be clear on just how innocuous this claim is, especially given the ongoing controversies amongst games theorists (and others), as to how videogames are best classified. Videogames being fictions in this sense is compatible with their failing to be fictions in various other senses. Perhaps videogames are not fictions in the everyday sense of that term (if there is such) or according to some other theoretical sense highlighted by those games theorists who deny that videogames are fictions. We think that many videogames (Bioshock, Sonic the Hedgehog, Resident Evil 5 etc.) are not only fictions in Walton’s sense but also under any plausible classification while others  (Wii Sports, SingStar,  Project Gotham Racing etc.) may only be fictional in Walton’s highly permissive sense. However, we will not argue for these claim here since our arguments only require  videogames to be fictions in Walton’s sense and this is perfectly compatible with the claim that they belong (perhaps in some more fundamental sense) to some other category. As such we can remain neutral with respect to disputes amongst game theorists concerning whether videogames are best seen as belonging fundamentally to the category of the fictional or the virtual.​[2]​ For those not convinced by such reassurances, or by our brief arguments in the last section, we offer a more complete defence of the claim that videogames are Waltonian fictions elsewhere (Meskin and Robson, forthcoming: 5-14). For the rest of this paper, though, we will focus our attention on defending the claim that videogames are Waltonian in the full-blooded sense; that is that they have all the features of fictions as laid out in Walton’s Mimesis as Make-believe. Or, rather, we will argue that if videogames fail to be fictions in this stronger sense this is only because of some general flaw in Walton’s theory and not because of some feature specific to videogames. It is not our purpose to defend or criticize Walton’s overall theory so from this point on we will merely assume that a full-blooded Waltonian theory can be adequately applied to canonical fictions.
Obviously it will not be possible for us to discuss all, or even most, of the claims Walton makes concerning fictions in Mimesis as Make-believe, so for the most part we will merely highlight those points of Walton’s theory which have been subject to specific objections in the case of videogames. Most of these aspects will be discussed in later sections when the objections themselves are raised, but it is worth pausing here to discuss one important feature at length - Walton’s work world/game world distinction, since this will play a vital role in a number of the objections we consider below.

It is not hard to get one’s head around the notion of a fictional world (i.e., the ‘world’ composed of, or at least associated with, the fictional truths explicitly or implicitly determined by a fiction). The fictional world of Doctor Who, for example, is associated with, or composed of, what is fictional (or fictionally true) in that series.  For example, the fictional world of Doctor Who contains Cybermen and a time-machine that looks like a 1960s London police-box, and it is true in that world that the Doctor has recently claimed to be 1103 years old. But Walton (1990: 58-61) proposes a novel distinction among fictional worlds—he suggests that we must distinguish the worlds of fictional works and the worlds of the games associated with those works. Work worlds are those fictional worlds associated with representational works or fictions (such as the worlds of Doctor Who and Buffy the Vampire Slayer) but in addition to those work worlds, there are what Walton calls ‘game worlds’ — fictional worlds associated with games in which those representations serve as props. That is, in addition to the world associated with Doctor Who, the work itself, there is also the world associated with our imaginative interactions with Doctor Who.
	Why talk about game worlds? In short, because there are things made fictional by our interaction with representations that are not fictional in (or according to) those representations. So, for example, according to Walton it is fictionally true when we see the Doctor Who Christmas special ‘The Doctor, the Widow and the Wardrobe’ that we are seeing the Doctor himself (‘Look at what the Doctor is doing’ we say to the rest of the family gathered around the television). And similar fictional truths are generated by other audience members’ viewings. But it is not true in the world of Doctor Who that we or any other audience member is seeing him. Rather, Walton suggests, we might say that these fictional truths belong to game worlds (i.e., the games of make-believe we play using the television show as prop). Similarly, albeit controversially, Walton argues that in the case of responses to fictions, it is typically only fictional that audience members have emotional responses that are directed towards the inhabitants of such fictions (though it is true, and not merely fictional, that we have certain affective responses which Walton labels ‘quasi-emotional’ aroused by those fictions) (Ibid: 241-249). But it is not standardly the case that such things are fictional in the worlds of the fictions themselves. It is not true, for example, in Doctor Who that we are scared of the Weeping Angels; our fear of the Angels is part of the game world associated with our watching of Doctor Who—not part of the work world associated with Doctor Who itself.
	Among game worlds, we may usefully distinguish between the authorised and non-authorised (Ibid: 60). We could, after all, imagine just about anything we wanted while watching Doctor Who; that is, we could play all sorts of imaginative games while watching the show; imagining that The Doctor was really a travelling carpet salesman, that the Cybermen are just misunderstood, etc. But the function of the show is not to be used in such a way. Game worlds associated with such odd imaginings are unauthorised, whereas those game worlds that accord with the function(s) of the representation (e.g., imagining ourselves to be afraid of the Angels) are authorised.
	This allows us to begin spelling out the relationship between work worlds and game worlds. So, for example, there is significant overlap between work worlds and their related game worlds since it is typically the case that what is fictional in a work world is fictional in the game worlds that are associated with it (e.g., it is fictional both in the work world of Doctor Who and the vast majority of Doctor Who game worlds that the Doctor is a Time Lord). Work worlds are (roughly) composed of those fictional truths that are fictional in all authorised game worlds.​[3]​
       With this understanding of the nature of work worlds and game worlds in place we can now look at an objection to a Waltonian account of videogames put forward by Grant Tavinor. 

3. Tavinor on Work Worlds and Game Worlds
In his various discussions of the nature of videogames Grant Tavinor is generally sympathetic to treating videogames as Waltonian fictions (Tavinor, 2005: 25; Tavinor, 2009: 40-41). However, he also claims that one key aspect of Walton’s theory; the work world/game world distinction discussed above is undermined or ‘smudged’ with respect to videogames (Tavinor, 2005: 34) In a previous paper (Meskin and Robson, forthcoming) we argue that Tavinor is mistaken and that the work world/game world distinction is as robust with respect to videogames as it is with canonical fictions. In this section we briefly recap this debate and consider its application to the particular issue of first-person representation.

Although Tavinor is not opposed to our making the work world/game world distinction with respect to canonical fictions, he believes the distinction is more problematic in the case of videogames (Tavinor, 2005: 34). Why is this? In the case of canonical fictions there is a clear distinction between the game world and the work world. In particular, self-referential fictional truths of the game world (e.g., that Aaron sees the Dalek, that Jon admires the Doctor) are not typically true in the work world since (sadly) neither Aaron nor Jon appear in the world of Doctor Who. As was mentioned above, only things that are true in all authorised games are true in the relevant work world. And none of us see the Dalek in every authorised game associated with the relevant television show since none of us are involved in every authorised game associated with it (there are other viewers after all). We do not, then, contribute to the truths of any Doctor Who episode. But according to Tavinor ‘players contribute to the truths of the work world of videogames’ (Ibid: 33). Player characters make ‘many new things fictionally true of that fictional world’ (Ibid) including things about their role in that world. So ‘the game world of the [videogame] fiction interposes on the work world’ (Ibid: 34). In brief, the smudging or blurring that Tavinor identifies arises from the way in which players may affect work worlds of fictions through their actions and responses rather than just affecting game worlds associated with those works. This strikes him as radically different from the case of ordinary fictions where audiences, their actions and their responses are typically isolated from the fictional (work) world.  
	Tavinor makes two important claims here (i) that, in contrast to consumers of standard fictions, players of videogames can often influence what is true in a work world and (ii) in videogames there is no clear distinction, between what is true in the work world and what is true in the various (authorised?) game worlds associated with it. We believe that the first of these claims, when correctly interpreted, provides an important insight into the nature of videogames and we will discuss this further in Section Six. The second claim, though, we take to be demonstrably false and have previously presented (in Meskin and Robson, forthcoming: 21-28) a number of counterexamples to it; instances where what is fictional in an authorised game world is not fictional in the work world. So, for example, we argued that in the recent Bioshock series, certain player decisions may make it the case that it is true in the authorised game world associated with a particular playing that the player feels guilty for their actions but there is no reason to believe that any character feels guilt in the world work associated with that playing (and, in particular good reason to think that the player character does not feel such guilt).

So, Tavinor’s second claim concerning videogames does not hold. However, in Section Six we will argue that it would be a mistake to dismiss Tavinor’s argument completely. Although his position is ultimately mistaken, it highlights some important features of videogames which set them apart from other fictions. Before discussing this, though, we will look at a more radical denial of Walton’s theory as applied to videogames.

4. Velleman on Artificial Agency
Like Tavinor, David Velleman also believes that videogames do not conform to the standard Waltonian account of fiction. (Velleman presents his proposal primarily with regards to the virtual world Second Life but given his repeated emphasis on ‘virtual play’ (Velleman, 2008: 407, 408 and 413) and some of the examples he chooses (Ibid: 424) it seems clear that he intends the point to apply to many videogames as well. ​[4]​) However, Velleman’s scepticism on this account goes much deeper than Tavinor’s and rather than merely suggesting that we abandon or amend one feature of Walton’s theory to account for our agency in videogames, he advocates a wholesale abandonment of attempts to construe videogames in Waltonian terms and to interpret videogame play as a matter of pretend play or make-believe. The second part of this claim is particularly striking since a refusal to accept our interactions with videogames as instances of make-believe would disbar them from being fictions not only on Walton’s view but also on a number of other influential accounts of fiction, such as those of Currie (1990) and Davies (1996), which treat fiction as essentially a matter of make-believe. Velleman’s central claim is, to put it starkly, that when engaging with virtual play we do not fictionally perform actions but ‘literally perform’ fictional actions (Velleman, 2008: 407).
	We are not sure exactly how to interpret Velleman’s claim, that we literally perform fictional actions, and are especially puzzled by Velleman’s insistence that our display of genuine agency differentiates engagement with the virtual from engagement with the merely make-believe. When we engage with fictions we pretend to do certain things—to see a unicorn, to read the diary of Lemuel Gulliver, to hide from the monster—but, of course, we are also genuinely performing certain actions in doing these things: looking at a picture of a unicorn, reading Gulliver’s Travels, and hiding from a friend who is pretending to be a monster. So it seems that in these cases we are still employing genuine agency. 
	To motivate the supposed difference, Velleman highlights a number of features which he believes distinguish videogames, and our interactions with them, from Waltonian fictions. In this section we will address three types of feature which seem to be key to Velleman’s account: (i) the phenomenology of out engagement with virtual worlds, (ii) the nature of our discourse concerning such engagement, (iii) the robustness of virtual truths. In the following section we will examine a series of claims which Velleman makes concerning aspects of the uniquely close relationship between the player and their avatar. We will argue that none of these features support Velleman’s view that videogames are not Waltonian fictions. We will show that many of the problems Velleman raises can be easily addressed by the Waltonian since they draw their initial plausibility from a focus on childhood games of make-believe rather that canonical fictions (and in many cases misrepresent the nature of childhood make-believe). Velleman does, however, highlight some important distinctions between videogames and canonical fictions; we will address these in Section Six but argue that they provide no reason to abandon the Waltonian view.

The first feature that we will address is the allegedly unique phenomenology which we encounter in virtual environments such as videogames. As an example of this Velleman claims that ‘players who send their avatars into unknown regions of the virtual word are genuinely curious about what they will find; they do not attribute a fictional curiosity to their avatars to account for their fictional explorations’ (Velleman, 2008: 412).  This is, we take it, intended to stand in contrast to the merely fictional curiosity we display concerning make-believe games and canonical fictions. This example, though, appears to rest on a mistaken equivocation of being curious about a fiction and being fictionally curious. We are often curious as to how a novel or film will end; this is curiosity concerning a fiction but it is not fictional curiosity. When reading Pride and Prejudice and Zombies for the first time we may be genuinely curious to know how the book turns out. Of course it is only fictional, at least on a standard Waltionian account, that we are curious as to what happens to Elizabeth, Darcy and their undead opponents, and there is nothing preventing a Waltonian from putting forward parallel claims concerning our videogame interactions. When playing Xenoblade Chronicles, much of the characters’ time is spent exploring the Bionis (the colossal creature on which the majority of the game’s character’s live). The Waltonian can accept that the player will most likely be genuinely curious to know about the game’s layout, what features the programmers have added to the virtual environment and so forth. They will, however, maintain that it is only fictional that the player is curious as to the location of hidden treasure or lurking enemies. Even in the case of childhood games of make-believe, on which Velleman largely bases his contrast, we can see the same phenomenon. Let us imagine, taking one of Walton’s classic examples, that we are playing a make-believe game in which any tree stump counts as a bear. In such a case, the Waltonian will claim, we may be generally curious as to what is true in this fictional world; there are so many places where stumps could (genuinely) be uncovered after all and as such so many places where we could (fictionally) stumble upon a hidden bear.

Velleman goes on to make a second claim concerning the phenomenology of our emotional involvement with fictional and virtual entities. With respect to an individual’s attitude to the former Velleman claims that ‘a monster that he has imagined and is aware of being able to kill by means of further imagining does not frighten him as a real monster would’ (Velleman, 2008: 411). Such a claim is, of course, perfectly in line with Walton’s view that our attitudes to such creatures would be one of quasi (as opposed to genuine) fear. With respect to virtual monsters, though, Velleman proposes that we hold a different ‘more realistic’ attitude based on our understanding that the world they occupy, while fictional, is not subject to our control. 
	Again, though, it is clear that Velleman has failed to establish any contrast between virtual horrors and standard fictional ones. The ghosts and ghouls of films and novels are at least as recalcitrant as those in videogames. Further, it is clear that our standard reaction to videogame monster is not ‘realistic’ in the sense of being anything like as intense as our likely reaction to encountering real life monsters. One of us has, today alone, encountered giant spiders, killer robots and murderous ogres in virtual environments but has no need for the extensive post-traumatic counselling that encountering any of these things in the real world would likely necessitate. Indeed all of Walton’s arguments that our fear in watching the green slime approaching is not genuine (our desire to repeat such experiences, the fact we don’t get up and leave the cinema, our continued belief that the object of our fear does not exist etc.) seem readily applicable, with slight adaptations, in the virtual monster case. Are our emotional (or quasi-emotional) responses to virtual horrors, as Velleman claims, typically more intense than our attitudes towards standard fictional ones? This is an interesting question, and one which we suspect cannot be solved from the armchair; however it is also not necessary for us to answer it here. Assume that Walton is right and that our ‘emotional’ reactions to fictions are only quasi-emotions, this account is perfectly compatible with the truth of Velleman’s claim. It should be clear that our degree of quasi-fear can vary considerably depending on the stimulus; some fictions are merely quasi-unnerving, others are quasi-terrifying. If it transpired that videogame peril was, ceteris paribus, more quasi-frightening than peril in games of make-believe or Hollywood movies then this would be an interesting psychological fact but not one that casts any doubt on Walton’s account. 
	Another feature which Velleman highlights in order to support this contrast is the way in which people describe their interactions with virtual environments. Consider, for instance, Velleman’s own example concerning players’ descriptions of falling in love in virtual worlds (Ibid: 412). There have been numerous, sometimes well publicized, cases of people carrying out whole relationships - meeting, striking up a friendship, dating, falling in love, cheating on their partners and separating– entirely, or at least primarily, within virtual worlds such as Second Life. These, Velleman stresses, are not like cases where we become fictionally enamoured with the protagonist of a novel or even, we assume, the complex and often tumultuous romantic relationships you can pursue with the computer controlled characters in a game like Dragon Age II. Those involved in such virtual relationships ‘describe themselves as being in love, not as authoring a fictional romance’ (Ibid). Of course, someone who accepts a Waltonian account of our emotional engagement with fictions will not typically take such avowals at face value; after all people will generally claim that they (or at least their less stalwart friends) are genuinely afraid of the fictional monsters on the screen. However, in the virtual romance case we are happy to grant that the emotions experienced are genuine; since they are not directed at fictional objects. The people involved do not love their partner’s avatar (assuming they are not suffering from some mental illness and except in the extended sense that you might love some other reflections of your partner’s personality such as their music collection or their wardrobe) but their partner themselves. The relationship then is not between fictional or virtual entities, or as Velleman sometimes suggests between hybrids of the real and the fictional (Ibid: 423), but between two genuine flesh and blood people. 
	Now of course, Velleman will argue, such relationships will make no sense if they are founded on entirely fictitious actions. Relationships based on merely pretended displays of affection and make-believe professions of love (that are known by both parties to be such) are unlikely to get off the ground. However, this response overlooks an important aspect of Walton’s theory; the claim that we can, and often do, genuinely perform certain acts by pretending to perform others. We can genuinely display a lack of sympathy for your plight by pretending to play a tiny violin and can genuinely display affection by pretending to blow a kiss. It is not problematic then, on a Waltonian theory, to claim that person A genuinely professes their love for person B by pretending to have their avatar profess love for hers. Falling in love with someone after only communicating via avatars is certainly a curious thing, just as it would be curious to fall in love with someone with whom you had only previously communicated via the medium of sock puppets. Neither, though, presents any theoretical problems. It may well be that in certain contexts we standardly perform the genuine action of asserting P by performing the fictional act of having our avatar, or our sock puppet, assert that P. 
	Similar considerations apply to other activities one might undertake in certain virtual environments. A law professor may genuinely educate others about the intricacies of property law in virtual environments by pretending to have her avatar lecture theirs on the subject (and indeed, as Velleman points out (Ibid: note 1), such activities have been undertaken). Clearly, though, not all virtual activities are reflexive in this way. It is often the case in a virtual environment, such as those found in the Call of Duty series, that players will make-believe that they are lying in wait to shoot their friends or setting a deadly trap for their brother. Typically a player will not feel resentment if their friend acts in such a way, and indeed would likely be far more worried if they discovered their friend had been spending their time indulging in private games of make-believe concerning their untimely demise.
	A more promising candidate for Velleman to appeal to here may well be entirely virtual relationships such as those in Dragon Age II. In such cases the player may say things like ‘I love Merrill’ in reference to one of the possible love interests for the game’s protagonist, just as some will say when watching Doctor Who ‘I love Amy’. Both of these can be accounted for in standard Waltonian terms where the player/viewer engages in a (possibly authorised) game world where they are in love with the character in question. However, in the Dragon Age II case the player will frequently say things, ‘I kissed Merrill’, ‘I bought Merrill a gift’, ‘I helped Merrill summon a demon’ (we do crazy things for love), the equivalents of which would be clearly unacceptable in the Doctor Who case. In Section Six we will have something more to say about such cases.

A third respect in which Velleman claims that ‘virtual play differs from typical make-believe is that players cannot make stipulative additions or alterations to the fictional truth of the game’ (Ibid: 407). The thought here, we take it, is that while what is fictional in a game of make-believe is entirely within the stipulative powers of the players, those engaging in virtual play need to undertake certain antecedently prescribed actions to make certain outcomes occur. When pretending to be a racing car driver a child can make it (fictionally) the case that they win a race merely by stipulating that they do or, if they are playing with other children, by persuading the group to assent to this stipulation. By contrast you cannot make it true-in-the-fiction that you won a race in Project Gotham Racing merely by stipulating that you did, even if fellow players are happy to go along with this stipulation. You can, of course, make-believe that you won the race, just as you can imagine that virtual dragons are really friendly kittens or that a virtual shack is a castle, but such imaginings are unauthorised.
	Even if this contrast holds, though, it fails to motivate the view that videogames are not Waltonian fictions. Compared to many standard fictions, videogames are remarkably open to alteration by the player. Consumers of canonical fictions are rarely able, by stipulation or otherwise, to affect what is true in those fictions. By taking certain actions in Mass Effect 2 one can make it the case that certain crew members survive the final mission (or, in a more malevolent frame of mind, that they don’t). By contrast, we are famously unable to affect what is true in many other fictions; we cannot save Romeo and Juliet no matter how much we may like to.​[5]​ Again, we will have more to say about this in Section Six.

5. Velleman on Avatars
In addition to the three claims discussed above, Velleman also motivates his alleged disparity by appealing to a series of related claims regarding the unique relationship between the player and their avatar. Firstly, he claims that there is an intimate link between the player’s view of the virtual world and their avatar’s; that the player ‘cannot learn about a part of the virtual world unless his avatar goes there. He sees only from the avatar’s perspective, and he cannot see around corners unless the avatar turns to look’ (Ibid: 408). Secondly, he argues that the identities of online players are importantly opaque in that ‘there is no way for players to emerge from behind their avatars to speak or act as their actual selves’ (Ibid: 410). Finally, he argues that in virtual environments players typically read off their own emotional attitudes towards the contents of such worlds whereas in make-believe cases the player is ‘likely to have invented this attribution rather than read it from his own feelings’ (Ibid: 411). 
	Velleman’s first two claims may well be correct with respect to some virtual environments but they seem at most to be contingent features of that medium and notably neither actually holds with respect to Velleman’s chosen example of Second Life. Taking the first claim first it is just not true (even disregarding the concession Velleman makes in a footnote that the players typically view the events of Second Life from ‘slightly behind and above their avatars’ (Ibid: note 6)) that the player only sees what their avatar sees. In various sections of Second Life the player can view all manner of things- menus, statistics etc.- which we assume they are not authorised to imagine their avatar seeing (such items are similar in this respect to thought bubbles in comics and subtitles in films​[6]​). Even leaving aside such exotica, the player in Second Life is able to manipulate the in-game camera away from its default position, while their avatar remains stationary, viewing the action from a number of different angles. In fact it is a relatively simple matter for the player to move the camera so as to view events from a perspective hundreds of feet away from their avatar and to observe objects completely out of their avatar’s line of sight.​[7]​ There are, however, extant examples of videogames which come much closer to realising the model Velleman suggests, including the Metroid Prime series and Mirror’s Edge, though even these are not perfect examples (for instance the saving and loading sections of Metroid Prime are viewed from a third person perspective). We do not deny that an example perfectly matching Velleman’s description is possible, or even that such an example actually exists (though we can’t think of one); what we want to make clear is that this feature is very far from being typical of the kind of virtual world which Velleman discusses. Velleman’s point is undermined yet further when we note that there are extant canonical fictions where the action is seen entirely (or almost entirely) from the viewpoint of a fictional character (for instance, the film Lady in the Lake). 
	The second claim concerning opacity is more typical with regards to virtual worlds such as Second Life. Two players in such a virtual world may engage in co-operative and competitive activities (building virtual castles, racing virtual vehicles, starting a virtual business etc.) for huge swathes of time without ever learning the other’s real names or discussing any matters relating to the real world. By contrast it would be extremely odd for two children who spent hours playing together in the real world to never discuss issues outside of their make-believe games. Similarly Velleman is correct that players in online games normally ‘don’t see one another’s faces’ (Ibid: 411) whereas those engaged in traditional game of make-believe typically do. However, this difference is not, as Velleman suggests a ‘significant difference between virtual and pretend play’ (Ibid: 410) but merely, as we will see below, a generalisation about the kinds of choices made by those taking part in (and setting up) these games.
	Velleman’s next claim concerning avatars is that in virtual worlds player cannot, within ‘the venue or the medium of the game’ (Ibid), communicate with other players, except through their avatars. Again, though, this seems plainly false when applied to Velleman’s central example of Second Life. There are a variety of ways for players to communicate with each other within the game and while some of these (for instance communicating via avatar speech bubbles) are clearly intended to be instances where their avatars are speaking we see no reason to think this of others such as the ‘in game’ chat bar and instant messaging services.​[8]​ A player could choose to only speak ‘as their avatar’ using such methods but  this is clearly not prescribed by the makers of Second Life and we suspect that, as a matter of empirical fact, such players are very rare. Further, even in cases where plays are exclusively able to communicate via their avatars, for example virtual environments where only avatar speech bubbles are available as means of communication, this does not restricted them to only speaking as their avatars. If two pirate avatars are sailing on a virtual boat and one says ‘I need to take a break to let the cat out’ it seems fairly clear that they are speaking qua player rather than qua avatar. Similarly if one asks ‘how do I raise the main sail?’ and the other replies ‘Press control and s’ it would be obtuse to imagine that one virtual pirate is giving this advice to another. An online game designer could, perhaps, prevent such activities by limiting the means of communication options available to the players (for instance allowing them a few dozen pre-set commands ‘Cast a fire spell’, ‘Heal me’ etc.). However, such opacity could also be introduced, though it would require significantly greater effort, in real life games of make-believe. Children could play all their games of pirates in pitch black rooms imagining that the illuminated sock puppets they wear are pirates travelling on a dark ocean and consistently determining to make-believe that any pirate who talked about, for example, ‘needing to go home to Mummy’ (or how another pirate had ‘cheated’) had clearly gone insane and needed to be made to walk the plank.
	These features of the player avatar relationship which Velleman highlights, then, seem to be merely stylistic choices with respect to how a particular virtual environment or game of make-believe operates and not ones which, as Velleman would have it, clearly distinguish the two.

Velleman’s final claim concerning the player/avatar relationship is that while players in virtual worlds read off their avatar’s emotions from their own, players in games of make-believe (and those engaged with canonical fictions) invent their egocentric emotional attributions. However, both aspects of this claim are mistaken. We have argued above, and in more depth in an earlier article (Meskin and Robson, forthcoming: 21-28) that there is a frequent disparity between the attitudes, emotional and otherwise, of players and their avatars. It is also a mistake to think that our emotional, or quasi-emotional, attitudes to fictional entities are typically invented in the way Velleman claims. It is obvious, we take it, that the viewer of a horror film does not merely stipulate that they are feeling quasi-fear as they see the slime approaching but rather, as we discussed earlier, they make-believe certain things (that they are afraid of the monster etc.) based on their (genuine) physiological reactions. Similarly when properly involved with a fantasy or straightforward game of make-believe we need not consciously ‘make up’ our quasi-attitudes but are instead able to, at least partially, read them off our own physiological reactions.

Velleman, then, is mistaken. None of the arguments he raises provide any motivation for denying that our interactions with virtual environments are make-believe in Walton’s sense. In the respects Velleman highlights our interactions with videogames are no further away from childhood games of make-believe than are our engagements with canonical fictions.  

6. Videogames and Canonical Fictions
We have looked above at Tavinor’s claim that videogames blur the work/game world distinction as well as Velleman’s claim that, for various reasons, Second Life (and, by extension, more traditional videogames) are not full-blooded Waltonian fictions. We argued, however, that paying careful attention to Walton's account of the nature of fictional works and to the nature of videogames themselves reveals that both these claims are mistaken. The work/game world distinction is just as robust in videogames as it is in standard fictions and once videogames are properly situated with respect to other works of fiction most of the features that Velleman points to (the robustness of fictional truths in these games, the existence of real curiosity about their virtual worlds, the extent of I-involving discourse such games engender, and the 'opaque' nature of virtual game play) can be straightforwardly explained. We do, however, recognize that there are phenomena associated with videogame play which differ importantly from our engagement with canonical fictions. These differences might explain, at least in part, why a number of philosophers have been tempted to treat videogames as not falling within the category of full-blooded Waltonian fictions. In this section we will briefly survey some of these differences, highlighted by Tavinor and Velleman, and suggest that, while they point to some interesting and underexplored aspects of videogames, they provide no reason to doubt that videogames are full-blooded Waltonian fictions.  

One of the most notable differences between videogame play and ordinary engagement with fiction has to do with the kinds of first-person discourse they engender.  As we have already discussed, certain forms of first-person discourse are not uncommon in our interactions with ordinary fictions. We have not, however, emphasized how pervasive such first-person discourse really is. Consider first-person ascriptions of emotional attitudes towards fictional characters and situations—‘I was frightened for so and so’, ‘I felt pity for the heroine’, etc.  Whatever one's view of such claims (i.e., whether they correctly describe full-fledged emotional states or, rather, must be understood as make-believe), it cannot be denied that they are a common aspect of our engagement with works of fiction. Similarly, we regularly talk, when watching a film for example, of ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ fictional characters. The difference between discourse about canonical fictions on the one hand and videogames on the other is not, then, that only the latter engender first-person discourse. We propose that the difference is that videogames engender first-person action talk to a much higher degree than do canonical fictions—when it comes to the former we talk about doing things in relation to the fictional world and its characters (‘I kissed the elf’, ‘I married the elf’), but this is much less common in the case of the latter where our first-person locutions are almost always mentalistic (i.e., perceptual, affective or cognitive). And even when we do use first-person action talk in relation to ordinary fictions (e.g., ‘I'm watching him’), this is typically a matter of broadly mental actions or acts; we may talk of falling in love with the heroine of a novel but we don't talk (or at least not very  often) of wooing her and kissing her. We propose, then, that the extent to which we engage in these sort of self-attributions, non-mentalistic self-attributions of fictively directed actions, is a key difference between our interactions with videogames and our interactions with ordinary fictions such as novels and movies. 
	A related point is highlighted by Velleman (2008: 412) when, in the course of his discussion of virtual play, he makes an interesting observation concerning the development of automaticity in players. Although a player may start out by intending to manipulate the mouse and keyboard and to thereby cause her avatar to act, these intentions tend to drop away and she comes to act by means of intentions to do things with her avatar; that is, rather than by intending to make her avatar do things. Velleman explicates this, initially rather opaque, contrast by asking us to consider what happens when we develop skills in tennis and come to 'treat the racket as under one's direct control' (Ibid: 413). Velleman points out that ‘as any tennis player knows, trying to make the racket hit the ball is a sure-fire way of missing’ and that instead one ought to treat the racket ‘as an extension of one’s arm’. Similarly when the proficient Street Fighter player wants to swing their virtual fist into Bison’s face they no longer (consciously at least) intend to press certain sequences on the controller or to make their avatar hit Bison but rather to hit Bison with their avatar (in the same manner in which a boxer would aim to hit an opponent with her fist rather than to make her fist hit her opponent). When they reach this point the player ‘intends to perform avatar-eye-coordinated actions in the virtual world, not real-world actions of controlling the avatar’ (Ibid: 414). We think Velleman has pointed to a significant and interesting phenomenon; videogame players do often develop a high degree of automaticity (though crucially this will also happen in cases where no avatar is involved - Command and Conquer, Lemmings etc.) and this is a feature that is not shared by our engagement with canonical fictions. 
	However, neither the preponderance of first person action talk nor the automaticity of virtual action gives us any reason to doubt that videogames are full-blooded Waltonian fictions. These features are absent from our engagement with ordinary fictions simply because such engagement does not involve the relevant kinds of intentions and actions. When reading a Dickens novel or watching a Tarantino film we do not act in a manner which, even fictionally, can be appropriately thought of as hitting a character or kissing them. As such it is no surprise that we do not typically speak of interacting with such fictions in this way and, of course, if we do not perform these actions we do not (a fortiori) perform them automatically. Turning to a different example, on the other hand, will show that Walton’s theory has no problems accounting for these features. In children’s games of make-believe it is not uncommon that, at some point, the children stop intending, for example, to manipulate the mud balls and start intending (or pretending to intend) to do things with the pies those mud balls represent. Similarly it would not be at all out of place for a child to proclaim, after making certain motions with their empty hand, ‘I stabbed the pirate’. The ubiquitous presence of such features in childhood games of make-believe, then, clearly shows that they fail to provide even a prima facie reason for regarding videogames as non-Waltonian.

A final difference relates to Tavinor’s claim (i) from Section Three that, in contrast to consumers of standard fictions, players of videogames can often influence what is true in the work world of the videogame. In one sense, of course, this claim is clearly false. Take the game Resident Evil 5 -- the plot of this game was written in its entirety by a group of game developers at Capcom long before any of us ever get our hands on it, and those interested in such things can easily find detailed descriptions of the game’s plot that make no reference to the actions of particular players.​[9]​ Nevertheless, there is a more charitable interpretation of Tavinor’s claim which correctly describes our interactions with videogames. To understand this we will need to return to an analogy we have made in previous articles (Meskin and Robson, 2010: 557-559; Meskin and Robson, forthcoming: 28-31) between performances of plays and playings of videogames. Consider a performance of the play Othello; the lead actor's physical appearance and actions will often determine what is true in that performance (as well as the production of which that performance is an instance); if the actor wears an earring we are likely authorised to imagine of Othello that he wears an earring, if the actor is tall then we imagine that same applies to Othello. (This tendency will have its limits; we are not to imagine that in various past performances of Othello it was fictional that he was a white man ‘blacked up’.) But while it might be fictional in the performance that Othello wears an earring, these things are not made fictional in Othello as such (that is, in the dramatic work written by William Shakespeare). The same will apply to many other aspects of a performance. Various different interpretations of Iago’s character may be true according to some performances and false according to others, Othello’s ethnicity may vary, and so forth. These things are true in the work worlds of their respective performances (and productions) of Othello, and not just in game worlds associated with those performances, but they are not true of the work world of Othello itself.
	In a like manner we suggest a distinction to be made between what is fictional in a videogame and what is fictional in various ‘playings’ of that videogame, with Tavinor’s proposal correctly applying only to the later. It is true in Resident Evil 5, the game itself, that Chris Redfield sets off to Africa to investigate a mysterious Biohazard outbreak, that he is aided by Shiva Aloma, that Jill Valentine is Chris’ former partner, Albert Wesker his deadly enemy and so forth. However, many things which are not true in the game simpliciter will be true according to the work worlds of various playings of it. According to some playings, Chris fails in his task and is killed in all manner of unfortunate ways, and even those ‘successful’ playing in which Chris survives and defeats Wesker will vary in all manner of ways; which enemies Chris fought and in what order, what weapons he used to dispatch each of them and so on. 
	Crucially the player has an ability to make things true in a particular playing of Resident Evil 5 which the audience of a play like Othello does not have. We can make things true in our particular game worlds associated with a performance of Othello but we are unable to make anything true in the work world of that performance. Our rushing on stage to save Desdemona, for instance, is famously not able to make anything fictional in the work world of (even that particular performance of) the play. By contrast in taking certain actions, such as inputting commands on a controller, we can make it true in a particular playing of Resident Evil 5 that Chris kills a snake with his knife.​[10]​ That this happens is true in the work world of the playing and not just the game worlds associated with it. As such we take Tavinor’s claim (i), when properly interpreted, to be the claim that the players of videogames, unlike the audiences of canonical fictions, can affect what is true in the work world of a particular playing of a game.
	However, it could be objected that this distinction holds only when we (mistakenly) treat the player of a game as analogous to the audience of a play whereas, in fact, the player's role is much closer to that of a performer.​[11]​ And, as we have already seen, performers can make things true with respect to the work worlds of individual performances of canonical fictions such as Othello. There is some truth to this objection, and we think that there are some important lessons to be drawn from comparing videogame players to theatrical performers. That said, we do not think that this objection undermines the disanalogy between videogames and canonical fictions which we are trying to highlight. The role of the player is certainly in some ways analogous to that of a performer but it is also in other crucial respects analogous to that of an audience member. The player is, after all, typically construed as a consumer of videogames and their role (particularly during cut scenes) is often a passive one. Even with respect to the more active aspect of their role the player is not strictly analogous to an actor. There is a sense in which traditional theatrical works enforce greater constraints on performers than videogames typically impose on players. A player can determine whether the main character in Bioshock is a hero or a villain, whether Chris survives his investigations in Resident Evil 5 and which of Niko Bellic's nearest and dearest survive the events of Grand Theft Auto 4. By contrast, the options standardly available to an actor playing Othello-- concerning the precise psychological make up of the character, his motivations at certain points and so forth-- are severely limited. The role of the player in a typical videogame will, we believe, be most strongly analogous to the role occupied in a semi-scripted interactive play by an audience member who is also a performer. This analogy is a highly suggestive one and one which we believe will be extremely useful in future work aimed at understanding the relationship between videogames and other fictions. However, plays which allow for individuals to take on such roles are certainly atypical and, crucially for our purposes, are not examples of canonical fictions. Our aim in this section is merely to highlight some interesting and important ways in which videogames differ from canonical fictions, not to propose any disanalogies between videogames and all other fictions. Indeed it is precisely the availability of such analogous cases among theatrical works, and other forms of fiction already fully theorised in Waltonian terms, which demonstrates that this feature of videogames, while noteworthy, does not prevent them from belonging to the broad category of full-blooded Waltonian fictions.

While the above features are doubtless important in understanding the ways in which videogames differ from canonical fictions, they do not provide even a prima facie case for denying that videogames are full-blooded Waltonian fictions. The kinds of action-involving discourse discussed above and the automaticity of action which Velleman highlights are not typically found in our interactions with canonical fictions but they are not precluded by any aspect of Walton’s theory. Nor need Walton deny that players are able to affect what is true in the work world of a playing. As we have already seen above it is possible for actors to influence what is true in the work world even with respect to performances of canonical fictions such as Othello, and in some somewhat less standard theatrical fictions actors (and even audience members) can have an extremely significant ability to affect what is true in the work world. 

Videogame play and the use of other computer-based virtual environments such as Second Life often exhibit a very high degree of user involvement. We seem, somehow, to ‘enter’ the world of those games and literally do things in them. This is reflected in the phenomenology of game play and in ordinary discourse about game play which is filled with rich action talk about what we do in the virtual world. These phenomena have led philosophers such as Tavinor and Velleman to argue that videogame play is not completely consistent with Walton's account of our engagement with canonical fictions. We have argued that careful attention to the ways works of fiction involve make-believe shows that Tavinor and Velleman are mistaken in thinking that one must give up or alter the Waltonian framework in the case of videogames. Although videogames have some distinctive features, these present no fundamental difficulty for understanding them in fully Waltonian terms.​[12]​ 
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^1	  Such remarks are to be expected from players of Destroy all Humans!, Disgaea and Echo the Dolphin: Defender of the Future respectively.
^2	  Tavinor (2009: 34-60) presents an opinionated overview of these debates.
^3	  Though only roughly, see Walton (1990: 60) for a more complete account.
^4	  We take no stance here as to whether it is appropriate to classify Second Life as a videogame but for convenience will refer to it as such for the remainder of this paper.
^5	  For a detailed discussion of this fact see Walton 1990: 191-195.
^6	  Of course there are rare instances of comics and films which break this convention. For instance the comic book character Deadpool appears to have an (intermittent) ability to perceive his own thought bubbles.
^7	  To enable this level of freedom the player must disable camera constraints or, in newer versions of Second Life, adjust the default ‘draw distance’.
^8	  For details of various communication methods available in Second Life see http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/Communication.
^9	  An interesting exception to this claim might be found in MMORPG’s (Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games). Here it seems that what is true in the work world can straightforwardly be influenced by the player. As was the case in, for example, the famous ‘Corrupted Blood’ incident, in the World of Warcraft (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4272418.stm). Such cases are extremely interesting and worthy of further discussion but for now we will focus our attention on a way in which the player can affect fictional work worlds not only in MMORPG but also in more traditional videogame formats.
^10	  This claim is, of course, importantly distinct from the false claim that it is fictional in that playing that those actions caused Chris to kill the snake. 
^11	   Greg Currie offered this objection to us in conversation.
^12	  This work was supported by a generous grant from the Arts and Humanities Research Council of the UK. A version of this paper was presented at a Centre for Aesthetics seminar at the University of Leeds. We thank the audience there for helpful comments. Thanks also to Greg Currie and Alice Kay. 
